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This paper explores the impact of two shocks, trade liberalisation policies and decline in 
remittances, on welfare and poverty in Pakistan. It begins by reviewing the economy, which 
reveals that during the Nineties although import tariffs were reduced by 55 percent, poverty 
however remained higher in this period than in the Eighties. At the same time, Pakistan has 
experienced a slow down in the inflow of remittances, which reduces the incomes of 
households and puts pressure on the exchange rate resulting in reduction in the inflow of 
imports despite a reduction in import duties. Thus, in the absence of the effects of decline in 
remittances, the analysis of the impact of trade liberalisation policies may render biased results. 
This study overcomes this constriction and analyses the impact of trade liberalisation policies 
in the absence and presence of decline in remittances in a CGE framework with all the features 
necessary for trade policy analysis with poverty and remittances linkages. The simulation 
results show that a decline in remittances reduces the gains from trade liberalisation. The 
negative impact of remittance decline dominates the positive impact of trade liberalisation in 
urban areas. But, the positive impact of trade liberalisation dominates the negative impact of a 
decline in remittances in the case of rural areas. Poverty rises in Pakistan as a whole. It shows 
that the decline in remittance inflows is a major contributory factor in explaining the increase 
in poverty in Pakistan during the Nineties.    
JEL classification:  O53, O24, C68, I32 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With a view to protect its nascent industries against imports, Pakistan has pursued 
protectionist trade policies since the 1950s. The industries enjoyed quite high levels of 
protection in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The import regime comprised of both tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. The latter included outright bans, quota restrictions, and imports 
allowed to specific users through an elaborate licensing system. These policies led to  
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wasteful use of resources by encouraging import substitution even in those industries 
where the country did not have long-run comparative advantage. Consequently, the 
distortion in resource allocation adversely affected the country’s economic and social 
conditions. Inefficiency in resource use has been one of the factors in the slow growth of 
output that has led to high levels of poverty in Pakistan.12 This calls for changes in 
policies and incentives and the market mechanism that help to reduce poverty. 
Pakistan adopted trade liberalisation policies in 1981 by reducing quantitative 
restrictions and rationalising the tariff structure, which reduces the rate of protection. 
Removal of import restrictions has a two-fold impact on poverty.23  The first effect is that 
a move towards free trade would increase the returns to the factor of production, which is 
abundant in the country. In the case of Pakistan, labour is the abundant factor.  Second, 
the reduction in import duties, especially on raw materials and machinery, is expected to 
result in a reduced cost of production and a reduction in prices. Similarly, reduction in 
import duties on consumer goods implies the reduction in the prices of imported finished 
products and import substitution activities. This helps in increasing real incomes. Tariff 
reduction, therefore, is expected to help in an improvement in aggregate welfare and a 
reduction in poverty.  
The empirical evidence on poverty and income inequality in Pakistan, however, 
contradicts the optimism of the proponents of trade liberalisation. Because Pakistan has 
experienced a rise in poverty and income inequality during the period of trade 
liberalisation. However, such an outcome may be defensible in view of the fact that along 
with the liberalisation in imports, Pakistan has also experienced a slow down in the 
inflow of remittances. The reduction in remittance inflow reduces the incomes of 
households and puts pressure on the exchange rate resulting in a reduction in the inflow 
of imports despite a reduction in import duties. Therefore, without incorporating 
remittances in the analysis to explore the impact of trade liberalisation on poverty, the 
results may be biased. In this study, we include the decline in remittances in presence of 
trade liberalisation for poverty change analysis. Poverty is expected to decline if the 
impact of trade liberalisation dominates the impact of decline in remittances, but would 
tend to rise if the impact of the reduction in remittances dominates.  
The present study proposes to assess the impact of two phenomenon on poverty by 
exploring the question: whether trade liberalisation or decline in remittances or both are 
responsible for the increase in poverty and inequality in Pakistan? The examination is done 
through the computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework. The model used in this study 
is closely related to previous CGE models built in various studies [see Decaluwe, et al. 
(1999)]. This paper presents a similar model that is developed for trade policy analysis in 
Pakistan under the Micro Impact of Macro Adjustment Policies (MIMAP) project by Siddiqui 
and Iqbal (1999b) and extended in the latter studies for MIMAP [see Siddiqui, et al. (1999a) 
and Kemal, et al. (2001); Siddiqui and Kemal (2006)].  
The plan of the study is as follows. The next section reviews the economy of 
Pakistan with particular reference to trade policies, structure of trade, remittance inflow  
1One-third of the population still lives below the poverty line. 
2The Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests that the per capita income differentials due to existing factor 
endowment differentials tend to disappear over time after trade liberalisation [for details see Krugman and 
Obstfeld (1994)].  
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and poverty levels. Section III summarises the results of the studies focusing on trade 
liberalisation, remittances and poverty linkages. Section IV presents data for the base 
year, discusses the methodology and model briefly. The results of the analysis are 
presented in Section V and Section VI concludes the paper.   
II. REVIEW OF ECONOMY  
(a)  Trade Policies 
Pakistan has maintained a complex system of trade policy regime since 1952. 
Import bans, quota, licensing requirements, other restrictions34 imposed to protect the 
domestic industry, and high tariffs have introduced serious distortions. The high tariffs 
imposed for protecting domestic industries and to raise revenues, have become counter-
productive. They have resulted in smuggling and corruption. Neither the revenue nor the 
protection objectives were achieved. Besides, until the mid-1980s, the non-tariff 
restrictions have remained binding, as the prices of imported goods, in general, have been 
higher than the landed cost. In 1981, about 41 percent of industrial value added was 
protected by import bans and another 22 percent by various forms of import restrictions 
[Kemal, et al. (1994)].  
Pakistan has initiated reforms in the trade regime in the early 1980s, with a 
view to creating an efficient and competitive manufacturing industry through an easy 
access to raw material, intermediate goods and machinery. The trade policy has been 
gradually liberalised and the producers have been exposed to the global market as it 
strives to make the local industry efficient and competitive.  In the 1980s quota 
restrictions were removed. In the 1990s the Restricted List was eliminated and those 
items that were to be restricted due to Health and Safety Requirements and 
Procedural Requirements have been added to the Negative List. For protecting the 
industries, tariffs are being used instead of quantitative restrictions (QRs). During 
1983-84 to 1993-94, 724 items were removed from the Negative List. Over all, the 
number of intermediate goods, consumer goods and capital goods on the negative list 
were reduced from 142 to 16, 32 to 7 and 221 to 107, respectively. At present, the 
negative list comprises only of 62 products mostly on religious, environmental, 
security and health grounds. Import licensing has gradually declined since 1981. And 
by the year 1993, it was eliminated. Now only an insignificant portion of total 
imports is subject to quantitative restrictions (QRs).45  All these changes resulted in a 
decline in protection rates. 
Table 1 presents the implicit nominal protection rate (NPRI) that takes into 
consideration the tariff equivalent of quota and the explicit nominal protection rate 
(NPRE). It shows that the percentage of industries where NPRI>NPRE fell from 34.4 
percent to 2 percent of manufacturing industries over the 1981-91 period.  This indicates 
that quota  restrictions  were  almost  non-existent in the later period.  Table 1  also shows   
3Import of capital goods was restricted through licensing, value limit and specificity of importers 
[World Bank (1989)]. 
4The banned items, on the “Negative List”, also include some textile products such as woven cotton 
fabrics, woven synthetic fabrics, bed linens, curtains, certain knitted fabrics and apparel items, tents, carpets and 
textiles floor coverings. However, all of these have been removed in 2001.  
Siddiqui and Kemal  386
Table 1 
Industries Protected by Tariff and Non-tariff Barriers  
Percentage of Industries 
Nominal Protection 1980-81 1990-91 
NPRI > NPRE 34.4 2.0 
NPRI < NPRE 57.8 71.7 
NPRI = NPRE 7.8 26.3 
Source: Kemal, et al. (1994).  
that NPRI fell short of NPRE, i.e., tariffs were prohibitively high, for 71.7 percent of the 
industries in 1990-91 compared with 57.8 percent in 1980-81 and the percentage of 
industries where tariffs were the binding constraints have increased from 7.8 percent to 
26.3 percent industries over 1981-91. In the presence of non-tariff barriers, tariffs play a 
minor role. However, with the removal of non-tariff barriers the protection levels 
becomes transparent. During the adjustment period tariffs have played a larger role in 
providing protection to industries.  
After reducing QRs, Government of Pakistan (GOP) focused on a rationalisation of the 
tariff structure; reducing tariff rates and their dispersion. During 1988-91, tariffs were reduced 
on 1134 items and increased on 462 items. The maximum tariff rate was reduced from 225 
percent to 100 percent. It was further reduced to 65 percent in June 1995. The number of tariff 
slabs was reduced from 17 to 10 during the same time period. Recently, the maximum tariff 
rate was reduced to 25 percent except for automobiles and alcoholic drinks and the number of 
tariff slabs has been reduced to four [Pakistan (Various Issues a, b)].  
Tariff rationalisation during the Nineties resulted in a decline in tariff rates on all 
categories of imports. On final capital goods, the tariff rate declined from 19.5 percent to 
7.3 percent, on final consumer goods from 24.6 percent to 9.6 percent, on raw material 
for capital goods from 31.9 percent to 15.4 percent and on raw material for the consumer 
goods from 19.5 to 10.6 percent. The average tariff rate was reduced by 55 percent, from 
22.2 percent in 1987-88 to 9.7 percent in 1999-2000 (Table 2). Recently, these tariff rates 
further reduced by 3, 6, 10 and 7 percentage points, respectively. On average, tariff rate 
declined by 4 percentage points during the period 2000-04.    
Table 2 
Tariff Structure by Commodity Group (Percentages) 
Final Imports of Raw Material 
  Years 
Capital 
Goods 
Consumer  
Goods 
Capital 
Goods 
Consumer   
Goods 
Average 
Tariff Rate 
1980-81 32.15 28.42 34.06 13.79 22.06 
1984-85 15.02 17.66 94.09 12.94 19.19 
1987-88 19.54 24.56 31.92 19.53 22.22 
1988-89 18.55 14.32 24.38 18.38 17.37 
1989-90 19.77 11.53 23.32 20.12 17.48 
1994-95 12.48 13.90 31.56 20.85 17.84 
1999-00 7.29 9.55 15.36 10.60 9.86 
2003-04 3.83 3.53 5.10 3.53 6.03 
Source:  Data on imports and tariff revenue are taken from Economic Survey [Pakistan (Various Issues b)] and 
CBR Year Book [Pakistan (Various Issues a)], respectively. 
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(b)  Structure of Trade 
Like most of the developing countries, Pakistan is dependent on agricultural-based 
exports. For a diversification of exports, it has to rely on imported raw materials, 
machinery, and capital goods for industrialisation. A comparison of the structure of trade 
during the Eighties and Nineties shows that the composition of imports by economic 
classification has not changed much over twenty years in spite of trade liberalisation. The 
share of imported capital goods in total imports has increased from 28 percent in 1980-81 
to 37 percent in 1985-86, but due to a slow down in the economy, especially in the 
industrial sector, import of capital goods declined to 25 percent by 2000-01. Recent 
increases in growth boosted investment which resulted in a sharp increase in imports of 
capital goods to 36 percent in 2004-05. The share of raw materials for consumer goods 
also shows a declining trend over the whole period, it declined from 50 percent in 1980-
81 to 40 percent in 1985-86, but since then it has increased to around 46 percent by 2004-
05. On the other hand, the share of imported inputs for capital goods has remained less 
than 10 percent throughout the period. The share of imports of final consumer goods 
increased from 14 percent to 18 percent over the 1980-86 time period and in the next 20 
years its share declined to 10 percent (Table 3).  
The structure of exports shows significant changes over time. The share of exports 
of primary goods, in 2005, is one-fourth of the 1980-81 level. The share of exports of 
semi-manufactured goods has increased from 11 percent to 24 percent over the 1980-81 
to 1990-91 period, but declined to 10 percent in the subsequent period. The exports of 
manufactured goods, however, show a consistently rising trend; its share increases from 
45 percent to 79 percent over the twenty-five year period (Table 3). 
Reductions in quantitative restrictions (QRs), reductions in tariff rates, 
increase in imports, increase in exports, the sum of exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP are the usual indicators used to measure the degree of openness. 
QRs were almost non-existent in the 1990s. On average, the tariff rate declined by 73 
percent during 1981-2005. It is important to note that in spite of the reduction in 
trade restrictions, imports as a percentage of GDP show a declining trend over the 
twenty-five year period: imports declined from 22.3 percent of GDP in 1980-81 to 
20.5 percent of GDP in 200556 (Table 4).  However, exports as a percentage of GDP 
show an increasing trend, from 12.8 percent of GDP in 1980-81 to 16.4 percent of 
GDP in 2004-05. The most commonly used indicator for openness is the total of 
exports and imports as a ratio of GDP, this indicator shows that despite a decline in 
imports, openness shows a slight increase, from 35.2 percent to 36.9 percent over 
twenty-five years (Table 4). The reduction in both tariffs and non-tariff barriers may 
seem surprising, but it needs to be underscored that during the 1990s because of 
inadequate foreign exchange reserves, the government had to resort to frequent 
devaluation making the imports expensive. Furthermore, low-level of economic 
activity constrained the demand for surplus goods.  
5The following factors are responsible for this decline. First, remittances declined very significantly, 
from $2.9 billion in 1982-83 to $1 billion in 1999. They were used to finance the trade deficit for a long time. 
Second, steep devaluation resulted in a lower level of imports. Third, economic activity slowed down in the 
1990s. 
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Table 3     
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Table 4 
Openness in Pakistan (Percentages) 
  Years Imports/GDP Exports/GDP 
Openness 
[(X+M)/GDP] 
1980-81 22.33 12.84 35.17 
1984-85 22.60 10.57 33.17 
1990-91 18.49 16.93 35.42 
1994-95 19.26 16.57 35.82 
2000-01 19.38 17.40 36.78 
2004-05 20.50 16.4 36.9 
Source: Economic Survey [Pakistan (Various Issues b)].  
(c)  Remittances 
Remittances have played a key role in the growth process of Pakistan. A comparison of 
remittance inflow with key economic indicators provides an assessment of the importance of 
remittances at the macro and micro level. During the Seventies and early Eighties, the inflow 
of remittances was very large, about $37 billion. In 1983 when remittances were at their peak, 
at 10.06 percent of GDP, they financed 96.6 percent of the trade deficit and 84.8 percent of the 
current account balance (Table 5). Remittances from the Middle East through official 
channels accounted for 14 percent of the growth in GNP (home country’s income) and it was 
24 percent when unofficial channels were also included [Burney (1988)].67  Since the mid-
eighties, remittances started to decline and reached one-third of the amount remitted in 1982-
83, i.e., $1.06 billion in 1998-99 from 2.9 billion in 1982-83 (Figure 1). This led to a rapid 
depletion of international monetary reserves, which affected the financing of the trade deficit 
(Table 5). This may be the reason for a decline in imports despite trade liberalisation;78 a sharp 
decline in remittances retarded the efforts of liberalisation. Since September 11, 2001, 
remittances have increased very sharply and reached 4 billion dollars. 
Fig. 1.  Historical Trend of Inflow of Remittances 
Figure 1. Historical Trend of Inflow of Remittances
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6GNP growth rate declined more than GDP growth rate, 7.9 percent in 1981-85 to 4.1 percent in 1996-
00. This may be due to the decline in remittances [Siddiqui and Kemal (2006)].  
7In a number of less developed countries (LDCs), severe deficits on current and capital accounts have 
therefore led to a rapid depletion of their international monetary reserves and a slowdown in economic growth.   
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Table 5 
Contribution of Remittances in Key Economic Indicators (Percentages) 
Financing through Remittances of 
  Years 
Current Account 
Balance 
Trade  
Deficit 
Remittances/ 
GDP 
Remittances/ 
Private 
Consumption 
1980-81 67.11 76.56 7.53 9.98 
1982-83 84.81 96.55 10.06 13.33 
1985-86 67.74 85.31 8.14 10.67 
1990-91 45.98 74.43 4.06 5.94 
1995-96 24.20 39.44 2.26 3.13 
2000-01 53.6 71.4 1.5 1.89 
2004-05 52.1 67.3 3.7 4.50 
Source:  Economic Survey [Pakistan (Various Issues b)].  
In addition to financing of imports at the national level, remittances have also 
played an important role at the micro level. Migrants remit a significant amount to 
Pakistan, on average 78 percent of their total earnings, and thereby increase the income 
of households. Studies by Burney (1988) and Kazi (1988) indicate that remittance 
income have been used for current consumption, retiring of debt or for repair of 
houses.89 The importance of remittances at the household level can be gauged from the 
fact that remittances were 13 percent of private consumption expenditure. Since 1982-83, 
the ratio (Remittances to Private Consumption) has shown a declining trend, i.e., 13.3 
percent in 1982-83 declining to 1.9910percent in 2000-01. The decline in remittance 
income of households may be an important reason for the rise in poverty in Pakistan 
during the Nineties.  Empirical studies indicate that remittances improve the 
recipients’ standard of living. Migrant workers from Pakistan, on average, received 
incomes five to eight times higher than they received from employment in their home 
country, remitting on average 78 percent of their earnings [Burney (1988)]. 
Therefore, a reduction in the flow of remittances is expected to have a dual impact on 
poverty. First, it reduces the impact of trade liberalisation by limiting the inflow of 
imports. Second, it reduces the income, as well, as consumption of households. 
Figure 2 shows that remittance inflow increased during 1970-83 and declined 
thereafter till 2000. After September 11, 2001, remittance inflow increases 
significantly.   
(d)  Poverty  
Poverty has increased irrespective of the choice of the measures of poverty; 
head count, gap, and severity index [Mehboob-ul-Haq Centre for Human 
Development (1999)]. It has increased in Pakistan during the Nineties (adjustment 
period) compared to in the Eighties (pre-adjustment period). Table 6 presents  
8Remittances are not utilised significantly to enhance the capital stock. At the sector level, the only 
sector, which appears to have benefited from the inflow of remittances, in terms of increased private 
investment, is ownership of dwellings.  
9To some extent the decline in remittances at the household level is understated. The remittances were 
also received through the hundi system. 
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absolute poverty based on a basic need poverty line and Table 7 presents relative 
poverty based on a poverty line of 75 percent of average income in the country. 
Table 6 shows that the number of poor has increased from 29.2 percent in 1987-88 
to 35.7 percent in 1993-94 and declined in 1999. The other two ratios, poverty gap 
and severity index, also show that poverty has increased during the adjustment 
period. The relative poverty measured by head count ratios increases from 45.6 
percent population to 51 percent over 1987-88 to 1993-94 period. The other two 
indicators, income gap and severity index, increased from 25.9 percent to 31 
percent and 4.4 percent to 7.1 percent over the same period of time, respectively.   
Table 6 
Poverty Indicators Basic Need Approach (Based on Distribution of Income) 
Pre-adjustment Post-adjustment 
Measure  
(Percent) Area 
1986-
87 
1987-
88 
1990-91* 1992-93 1993-94 1998-
99** 
2004-
05 
Head Count Pakistan 28.6 29.2 29.4 35.9 35.7 32.6 35.7 
 
Urban 28.8 28.9 31.3 29.7 29.9 24.2 –  
Rural 28.1 30.1 29.1 39.1 37.3 35.9 – 
Income Gap Pakistan 20.6 21.1 26.3 28.9 27.9 7.0 –  
Urban 21.2 21.7 25.5 26.6 24.1 5.0 –  
Rural 20.2 20.1 26.1 28.3 27.5 7.9 – 
Severity Index Pakistan 1.8 1.9 3.1 4.5 4.1 1.51 –  
Urban 1.9 2.0 3.2 3.4 2.8 2.51 –  
Rural 1.7 1.9 3.0 4.8 4.2 2.2 – 
Source: Mehboob-ul-Haq Centre for Human Development (1999). *Poverty lines for the year 1990-91 for 
Pakistan, rural and urban areas are 276.7, 257.6 and 307.9 Rs respectively. **World Bank (2002) For 
the income gap ratio, they use percentage in total.   
Table 7 
Relative Poverty Indicators for Pakistan, Urban and Rural Areas 
Pre-adjustment 
Period 
During Adjustment 
Period 
Measure (Percent) Area 1986-87 1987-88 1990-91* 1992-93 1993-94 
Head Count Pakistan 47.5 45.6 52.9 51.6 51.0 
Urban 52.5 49.3 57.0 54.2 53.5  
Rural 38.6 37.9 49.6 46.5 43.0 
Income Gap Pakistan 25.9 25.3 33.1 33.0 31.6  
Urban 27.8 26.9 33.4 33.2 32.1  
Rural 22.7 22.2 32.1 30.3 28.6 
Severity Index Pakistan 4.4 4.1 7.9 7.8 7.1  
Urban 5.5 4.9 8.6 8.2 7.4  
Rural 2.9 2.7 7.0 6.2 5.1 
Source:  Mehboob-ul-Haq Centre for Human Development (1999). *Poverty Line = 75 Percent of the Average 
Income (Based on Distribution of Income) Poverty lines for the year 1990-91 for Pakistan, rural and urban 
are 388, 348 and 441 rupees respectively. 
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III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A number of empirical studies1011have analysed the impact of trade liberalisation 
based on the Stolper-Samuelson theorem—one of the central results of the Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory. The studies analyse the change in poverty and welfare when a country is moving 
from autarky to free trade. These studies demonstrate how changes in output prices caused 
by changes in tariffs translate into the change in the prices of the factors of production with 
positive production and zero economic profit condition. Convergence in relative prices of 
the factors of production1112may reduce inequality through increased demand for labour, the 
most abundant factor in developing countries like Pakistan. However, the empirical results 
are very sensitive to the country sample, time period and specification of the model. The 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests that the per capita income differentials due to 
existing factor endowment differentials tend to disappear over time after trade 
liberalisation [Krugman and Obstfeld (1994)]. The change in the relative prices of goods 
together with a change in income affects households’ consumption. Tariff reductions 
reduce import prices and benefit consumers by supplying cheap consumer goods. 
Depending on the elasticity of substitution, in presence of trade liberalisation, consumers 
start to substitute imports for domestically produced goods. Consequently, the demand 
for domestic goods falls and domestic prices decline further.  
Bourguignon, de Melo, and Suwa (1989) show that devaluation that is pro-trade helps 
the poor in the low income countries as it encourages export-oriented industries, which 
employ more workers. On the other hand, import rationing worsens inequality because the 
rationing premium accrues to capitalists. Clarete and Whalley (1988) explore the ways in 
which trade policies and other domestic distortions interact in the small open developing 
economy. Using a price-taking open economy numerical general equilibrium model of the 
Philippines, they report that in the presence of import quota and rent-seeking activities, tariff 
removal makes the country worse off. Another model with special emphasis on distributional 
issues is developed by Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982) for three archetype economies.  
They suggest that the distributional implications of an external shock depend on the initial 
structure of the economy and the choice of adjustment policies.   
Decaluwe, et al. (1999) and Cockburn (2002) explicitly incorporate poverty and 
income distribution in a CGE framework. Decaluwe, et al. (1999) developed a beta-
distribution based approach on the basis of parameters chosen according to the 
characteristics of households and a basic need poverty line determined by quantity of 
basic need commodities. The change in monetary value of the poverty line with the 
change in prices is determined endogenously in the model. The study shows that a 
reduction in tariffs is beneficial to the alleviation of poverty.  Cockburn (2002) analyses 
the impact of trade liberalisation on poverty using micro simulation. He argues that trade 
liberalisation can only be properly analysed in a CGE model with disaggregated 
household data, and developed a model for Nepal incorporating all households from a 
nationally representative household survey. He emphasises that complex income and 
consumption effects could not be analysed in an aggregate CGE model. Using the micro 
simulation method, the study shows that urban poverty falls and rural poverty rises and 
income inequality increases with the rise in income.  
10Guisinger and Scully (1991), Decaluwe, et al. (1999), Siddiqui and Iqbal (1999), Cockburn (2002), 
Kemal, et al. (2002), etc. 
11Stolper-Samuelson theorem of price equalisation.  
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The literature related to the “impact of remittances on poverty” explains how the 
recipients typically use remittances and how they affect economic indicators in the country. 
Studies show that remittances are mainly used for current consumption; the rest is spent on the 
maintenance of dwellings. During the large inflow of remittances, investment in ownership of 
dwellings increases by a higher percentage [Burney (1988)]. Migrants who belong to the low-
income class before migration save less and spend more on current food and consumer 
durables as compared with medium and high-income groups. Another study by Kruijk (1987) 
exploring the sources of income inequality points out that, in addition, to labour and property 
income, exogenous factors like migration to the Middle East had played a very important role 
in reducing poverty during the mid-Seventies and early Eighties.1213The direct and indirect 
effects of remittances suggest remittances are beneficial for trade in goods and 
services,1314income growth, and contribute to savings (though a negligible amount). 
Therefore, it can safely be concluded that remittances can (and do) make important 
contributions to welfare enhancing and poverty reduction. During the Nineties, remittances 
have declined sharply in Pakistan, it may be the major factor giving rise to poverty.   
Fig. 2. Poverty and Inflow of Remittances (Percentages)   
R E M /G D P P P 
P R P U      
REM/GDP—Ratio of Remittances to GDP 
PP—Poverty in Pakistan, PR—Poverty in Rural area, PU—Poverty in Urban area  
IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A consistent data set for the year 1989-90, using the Input-Output table for 
1989-90 [Pakistan (1996)], Household Integrated Economic Survey (HIES) [Pakistan 
(1993)] and SAM 1989-90 [Siddiqui and Iqbal (1999a)], is constructed. Production 
activities in agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services are classified on the 
basis of their characteristics viz. import competing and exporting orientations. 
Agriculture is subdivided into the crop and non-crop sectors. The manufacturing 
sector is aggregated into five activities: food, textiles, chemicals, machinery and 
other manufacturing. The services sector is classified into three activities, two  
12See Irfan (1997), Amjad and Kemal (1997) and Usman, et al. (2000). 
13In addition to providing money for basic needs such as food, clothing, housing improvements, and 
education, it provides hard currency for consumer goods such as small household appliances. 
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tradable and one non-tradable sector. The main characteristics of these sectors are as 
follows: The crop sector provides raw material for exports in particular to the textile 
industry, the major export supplying sector accounting for 67 percent of total 
exports. ‘Chemicals’ and ‘Machinery’ are the major import competing sectors and 
the rest of the sectors have mixed characteristics. The imports account for 30.9 
percent and 55.6 percent of the expenditure on chemical and machinery, respectively. 
The shares of imports of these sectors in the overall imports of the country are 18.4 
percent and 37.5 percent, respectively [Siddiqui and Kemal (2006)].  
Earlier studies show that a large percentage of remittance income accrues to poor 
households as 81 percent of migrants belong to production workers and only 19 percent 
to the professionals. Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 1989-90 provides information on 
the sources of household income by income groups. In this study, we classify households 
by occupation in urban and rural areas as the two areas present different levels of poverty. 
They are aggregated by occupation of head of households into five categories; 
professionals, clerks, agriculture skilled workers, production worker and miscellaneous. 
We identify five sources of household income;1415labour, capital, dividends from firms, 
transfers from government and transfers from the rest of the world. The first three sources 
of income are endogenously determined in the model. The distribution of remittance 
income across the households is fixed in the model. Therefore urban households who 
receive a larger share of remittances 77 percent of remitted income, experienced larger 
negative effects of a decline in remittances.  
Table 8 
Sources of Income for Rural and Urban Households (Percentages)  
Wages Capital Dividends
 
Transfers from 
Government Remittances Total
Professional 59.46 24.23 14.81 0.41 1.09 100 
Clerks 28.53 38.41 18.86 0.31 13.88 100 
Agriculture 
Worker 13.01 76.42 0.00 0.16 10.41 100 
Production 
Worker 51.52 34.38 5.15 0.18 8.78 100 
Miscellaneous 23.52 63.58 1.72 1.72 9.47 100 
Urban Total 33.99 45.96 9.40 0.71 9.95 100 
Professional 19.18 80.48 0.00 0.05 0.29 100 
Clerks 38.95 56.53 0.01 1.45 3.06 100 
Agriculture 
Worker 13.82 81.55 0.43 2.27 1.93 100 
Production 
Worker 56.77 31.22 3.75 0.98 7.29 100 
Miscellaneous 16.97 54.37 19.22 4.57 4.87 100 
Rural Total 26.51 63.61 4.40 2.09 3.40 100 
Source: Social Accounting Matrix, 1989-90.  
14Income refers to total receipts. 
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Table 8 reports the share of households’ incomes from different sources. In the urban 
sector, professionals receive 59.5 percent of their income and production workers receive 
51.5 percent of their income from labour. The other three groups in the urban area receive 
higher percentage from capital. All households in the rural area receive a higher percentage 
of their income from capital except production workers who receive 56.8 percent of their 
income from labour. In the urban households, the share of remittances in total household 
income ranges from 1 percent to 14 percent and mean level is 9.95 percent. In the rural area, 
it ranges 0.3 percent to 7.3 percent with mean of 3.4 percent. It needs to be underscored that 
the share of remittances in the incomes of professional groups, who are relatively rich in 
both the urban and rural area is only 1.0 percent and 0.2 percent of their total income, 
respectively. On the other hand, urban households—clerks—receive 35.8 percent of 
remittances. In the rural area, production workers receive 8.43 percent of remittances (Table 
9). Both types of households are relatively poor and 31.5 percent and 36.3 percent of 
households, respectively, are below the poverty line (Table 9).  
Table 9 
F-G-T Indicators of Poverty and Remittances Share (Percentages)  
Base Year (P -Measures) 
 Households by 
 Occupation Households
 
Head  
Count 
Poverty  
Gap 
Severity 
Index 
Share of 
Remittances
Professional 2.71 19.92 4.68 1.15 0.92 
Clerks 14.91 31.52 3.77 2.42 35.76 
Agriculture Worker 2.12 35.33 7.43 1.44 5.06 
Production Worker 13.83 40.08 5.51 1.26 13.62 
Miscellaneous 7.11 23.44 9.39 3.25 21.92 
Urban Total 40.68 32.44 7.27 2.36 77.28 
Professionals 9.07 25.2 5.2 1.42 0.22 
Clerks 2.37 34.25 7.38 2.33 3.31 
Agriculture 11.56 28.3 6.43 2.12 4.68 
Production Worker 22.29 36.3 7.31 2.22 8.41 
Miscellaneous 14.03 23.19 4.58 1.41 6.09 
Rural Total 59.32 30.47 6.49 2.05 22.72 
Source: Social Accounting Matrix, 1989-90.  
Using the above-mentioned consistent data set, the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model is used to simulate the impact of tariff reduction and the 
decline in remittances. The model is similar in many respects to the CGE model 
developed for the MIMAP-project, which has been developed to analyse the impact of 
trade liberalisation on welfare and poverty1516in Pakistan. The main characteristics of the 
model are discussed below.  
In the neo-classical framework, this model contains six blocks of equations; income 
and saving, production, foreign trade, demand, prices, and market equilibrium. The model 
has four institutions: households, firms, government and rest of the world. The ownership  
15For details see Siddiqui and Iqbal (1999b) and Siddiqui, et al. (2006). 
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of factors of production and their returns determine factor income. All wage income 
accrues to households, as they own all labour. In addition, households receive income in 
the form of remittances from the rest of the world, transfers from firms as dividends and 
transfers from government as social security benefits. Transfers from government and 
rest of the world are exogenous. The effect on income of households due to trade policy 
shock is determined through changes in the endogenous sources of income: wage income, 
capital income, and dividends from firms. The household’s dividend income is defined as 
fixed share from the firms’ capital income. After subtracting income tax from the 
household’s total income, we get the disposable income of the household. Household 
savings are defined as a fixed share of households’ disposable income. The second 
institution—the firm receives income from two sources; receipts from capital and 
transfers from the government. The firm’s capital income is defined by subtracting the 
sum of the household’s capital income from production activities. Transfers from the 
government to firms are given exogenously. Its expenditure includes tax payments to the 
government, dividends to households, and transfers to the rest of the world. Subtracting 
all these from the firm’s income, savings of the firms are calculated. The third institution, 
government receives tax revenue from various sources; international trade, production, 
households’ income and tax on capital income of the firms. These five types of taxes 
endogenously determine government revenue. In addition, the government also receives 
transfers from the rest of the world, which are fixed exogenously. Subtracting transfer 
payments to households and firms and government consumption expenditure from 
government revenue we get government savings. The fourth institution is the rest of the 
world. Its income includes income from sales of imports and transfers from firms, and 
outlay includes expenditure on exports, remittance income to households and transfers to 
government. 
Domestic production has eleven sectors—ten tradable and one non-tradable.1617All 
production activities employ factors of production; labour and capital. Labour is assumed 
to be homogeneous and mobile across the sectors, while capital is sector-specific. 
Production functions are specified by a technology in which gross output has separable 
production function for value added and intermediate inputs. Leontief technology 
between intermediate and output and within intermediates is assumed. The value added is 
defined by the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production functions. Assuming 
perfect competition and market clearing conditions, labour demand function for ith sector 
is derived from the Constant Elasticity of Substitute (CES) production function. Returns 
to capital are determined by the zero profit condition.  
Goods for the domestic market and for foreign market (exports) with the same 
sector classification are of different qualities. The Constant Elasticity of Transformation 
(CET) function describes the possible shift between domestic and external markets. 
Domestically produced goods sold in the domestic market are imperfect substitutes for 
imports (Armington assumption). The import aggregation function presents demand for 
composite goods (imported and domestically produced goods). For non-traded goods, 
total demand is equal to total domestic supply. Profit maximisation or cost minimisation 
gives desired exports supply and imports demand functions of relative prices (domestic to 
foreign prices). The equilibrium in the foreign market is determined with inflow and out  
16For detail see Siddiqui and Kemal (2006). 
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flow of goods and transfers across the border. Nominal exchange rate and current account 
balance are given exogenously, while the real exchange rate is implicit in the model. 
Keeping the CAB and nominal exchange rate constant, real exchange rate depreciate 
leading to cheap exports.    
In the model, we have four types of demand for goods and services: household 
consumption, government consumption, intermediate inputs, and demand for goods for 
investment purposes. Total household consumption is defined as residual after 
subtracting saving from disposable income. Household demand is specified by the linear 
expenditure system (LES). It is derived from maximising a Stone-Geary utility function 
subject to the household’s budget constraint.1718Using the Frisch parameter1819and income 
elasticities, which are given in the model exogenously; we derive the minimum 
consumption of a good by a household group. Government expenditure includes 
expenditure on goods and services, transfers to households, and transfers to firms. 
Government current expenditure on the ith commodity is derived by Cobb-Douglas utility 
function and is defined as fixed share in total expenditure. The private and public 
consumption are aggregated to get total consumption expenditure. The sum of input 
requirements by the production sector for each commodity produced determines 
intermediate demand for the ith commodity. Demand for goods for investment purposes 
is the fixed value share in total investment.  
For welfare analysis, we fixed total demand for investment and government 
consumption in real terms so that increase in welfare may not be at the expense of 
government consumption or investment. We deflate current investment demand by its 
deflator and get investment in real terms. Deflating current government expenditure 
with its deflators gives government consumption in real terms.  
The model contains different prices associated with each good. We retain the small 
country assumption. World prices of exports and imports are given. Domestic price of 
exports and imports are defined after including taxes, if any. Imports are restricted 
through tariff barriers and sales tax is also imposed on imported goods. Producer price is 
the weighted average of the domestic price of goods for the domestic market and the 
domestic price of goods for the export market. There is a sales tax on all goods, so 
domestic price is determined after including taxes. Consumer prices are the weighted 
average of domestic price and import price of the nth commodity for traded goods and for 
non-tradables it is equal to the domestic price. GDP deflator (Pindex) is the weighted 
price index of all goods. The two deflators for investment goods and government 
consumption are defined as the weighted average of all commodities.  
The final block presents equilibrium conditions. Total investment is equal to total 
domestic saving and foreign savings. Total consumption expenditure on the ith good is 
the sum of expenditures by different household groups and government, intermediate use 
by different production activities and demand for investment purposes. Walras’ law 
holds. Total labour demand is equal to labour supply, which is given exogenously. We 
use the external sector closure rule in the model. We assume price-taking behaviour for 
exports as well as for imports in the international market1920i.e., world export price and 
world import price are exogenous to the model.   
17Maximising u(X) = fi (Xi) = 
 
i log( i)  subject to constraint  PiXi = Y. 
18For a detailed discussion of Linear Expenditure Systems, see Deaton and Muellbaur (1987).  
19Small open economy assumption. 
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The model described above has been calibrated to the data of the Pakistan economy for 
the year 1989-90. Policy parameters, all tax rates, savings rates are calculated from the base 
year data. Shift and share parameters in the demand and supply equations, are also generated 
from base year data. For the consumption function, household specific income elasticities for 
each commodity are estimated from micro data from the Household Integrated Economic 
Survey. Elasticities for import aggregation and export transformation functions are taken from 
different studies.21 Elasticities for production function are taken from Kemal (1981) and 
Malik, et al. (1989). The elasticities which were not available are fixed after discussion.  
The study focuses on welfare and poverty outcome of policy shocks. 
Equivalent variations (EV) are estimated to see the change in welfare of the 
households. We use Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984) P
 
measures for 
poverty analysis, Where P0 measures the households below the poverty line, P1 measures 
poverty gap and P2 measures severity of the poverty.2122 We use micro data from the 
national representative Household Integrated Economic Survey [Pakistan (1993)] of 
more than six thousand households. Basic need-poverty line is estimated on the basis 
of adult equivalent calorie intake  for the base year.2223 For the non-food items, we 
take the average of the expenditure of the households’ two percentage points above 
and below the food poverty line. The poverty lines are estimated separately for urban 
and rural areas to eliminate the impact of price differentials between the regions.   
Poverty estimates for the base year are given in Table 9. In urban and rural areas, 
production workers are the poorest group of households, where 40.1 percent and 36.3 
percent of households respectively live below the poverty line. Table 9 clearly shows that 
the poor receive a higher percentage and rich households receive a lower percentage of 
remittances. For example, clerks in the urban area receive 35.8 percent of remittances. In 
the rural area, production workers’ share is highest, at 8.4 percent of remittances. The 
other two groups, agriculture skilled workers and clerks can be classified as poor 
households where about one-third of households are below the poverty line in both, urban 
and rural areas. The professionals and miscellaneous groups are classified as rich 
households (Table 9) in urban and rural areas. They receive only 0.9 percent and 0.2 
percent of remittances, respectively.   
For poverty change analysis,2324the real value of poverty (quantity) is kept fixed in 
every simulation [see Decaluwe, et al. (1999)]. However, the poverty analysis approach 
differ from Decaluwe, et al. (1999) in some aspects, it uses micro data from the HIES 
instead of assuming -distribution. The monetary value of the poverty line is obtained by 
multiplying the product with their respective prices. If qi is the quantity and Pci is the 
price for ith good then we define the monetary value of basic need poverty (BNPm) line 
for the base year as follows: 
BNPm  =  qio*Pcio  
20For detail see Kemal, et al. (2002). 
21P = 1/n (Z–Y )/Z} where n is total number of households, Z is basic need poverty line, Y is 
income and = 0 for head count ratio, = 1 for poverty gap measure and = 2  measure the severity of 
poverty.  
22Detail is given in Ercelawn (1990) and Ravallion (1994). 
23For detail see Decaluwe, et al. (1999). 
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Prices are determined endogenously in the model. As prices rise or fall after the 
simulation, the monetary value of the poverty line rises or falls as well.  The change in 
poverty line is determined as follows 
BNPm  =  
 
qio*Pci1 – qio*Pcio 
Note: o indicates the base year and 1 indicates after the shock.  
Changes in prices shift the poverty line and the change in income of the group 
shifts the density function left or right depending on the negative or positive change in 
income [Siddiqui, et al. (2006)]. These two changes determine the change in poverty after 
the policy shock in the country. We calculated these poverty indicators before and after 
the shocks. First, we simulate the impact of tariff reduction in the base year equilibrium. 
Second, tariff and remittances are reduced simultaneously to see how the impact of trade 
liberalisation changes in the presence of a decline in remittances.  
The list of equations along with endogenous and exogenous variables is given 
in Appendix A. The General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) software package is 
used to solve and simulate the model.  
V.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
The results of two simulation exercises are discussed here. First, a tariff cut on 
imports by 55 percent is introduced in the model to examine the impact of trade 
liberalisation on welfare and poverty keeping remittances constant. A reduction in trade 
barriers has a two-fold impact on households: (1) a reduction in distortions in domestic 
prices relative to world prices, results in a reallocation of resources from the protected 
sectors to the unprotected sectors. In turn, it affects payments to factors of production. This 
change in factor rewards results in a change in households’ incomes depending on their 
ownership of the factors of production. (2) The consumer reallocates expenditure from 
expensive goods (domestic goods produced by import competing sectors) to relatively 
cheaper goods (imports) and reduces expenditure on domestically produced goods.  
In the second exercise, we reduce remittances by 44 percent in the presence of 
tariff reduction of 55 percent. A decline in remittances results in a decline in the income 
of households depending on their share in remittances. The households, who receive 
larger share of total remittances experience a larger negative effect of the decline in total 
remittances i.e., 77 percent of total remittances, accrue to urban households. The decline 
in income affects the household welfare. The tabulated results indicate reallocation of 
resources, the change in factor rewards, household income and expenditure, welfare and 
poverty in Pakistan in response to the policy shocks.  
Simulation 1. Trade Liberalisation  
In the first simulation, we reduce the tariff rate by 55 percent across the board on all 
imports. Table 10 describes the effects on the macro economic variables. The reduction in the 
tariff rate leads to a decline in the relative prices of all imports significantly except in the 
mining and the other traded sectors—the unprotected sectors in the base year. The reduction 
in protection reduces competitiveness of sectors and producers reduce their production and 
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shift resources towards unprotected sectors. Consumers substitute cheap imported goods for 
the domestic goods that lead to a large inflow of total imports, i.e., a 4.5 percent increase over 
the base year.  
Depending on the elasticity of substitution and the share of imports in total 
consumption in the base year, demand for all imports increases except in unprotected sectors: 
mining and other traded (Table 10). The reduction in domestic costs caused by the tariff cut 
increase the profitability of the export sectors. This leads to the expansion of output and 
employment in the export sector notably in ‘textiles’.2425However, the increased inflow of 
imports is by no means enough to eliminate the import competing sectors. Output declines 
significantly in Chemical, Machinery and ‘Other Manufacture’ sectors by 2.8 percent, 2.0 
percent and 2.0 percent, respectively (Table 10).   
Increase in imports with fixed current account balance and nominal exchange rate lead 
to depreciation of the real exchange rate, which boosts exports. The strength of this export 
response depends on the fall in domestic prices, the capacity of local producers to 
substitute between local and export markets, and initial export intensities. However, this 
increase in exports is not fully compensated by the decline in domestic demand. Only the 
crop and textile sectors show an increase in domestic production after the shock, 0.1 
percent and 5.4 percent, respectively, indicating trade liberalisation benefits the export 
sector of Pakistan more. Depending on the elasticity of substitution, elasticity of 
transformation and share of imports and domestically produced goods in their respective 
domestic demand, domestic demand for the textile sector increases by 3 percent.  
The fall in output in a number of sectors leads to a decline in demand for factors of 
production. Released factors of production from inefficient sectors, which are relatively more 
protected, move towards efficient or unprotected sectors that are more productive. Resultantly, 
labour demand increases in the export-oriented sectors ‘crop’ and ‘textile’ by 0.43 percent and 
16.3 percent, respectively. Returns to capital increase in ‘Textile’ sector by 6.1 percent. The 
expansionary effects in some sectors, mainly in export sectors cannot outweigh the 
contraction effects in the import competing sectors, chemicals and machinery. Thus, both 
returns to labour and capital (an index) decline by 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent, respectively 
(Table 10). The results confirm the proposition that trade liberalisation affects more negatively 
sector specific factors of production.  
The significant disparity in poverty levels among the different groups of 
households requires an investigation into the variation in the various income sources after 
the policy shock. The reduction in factors prices, wages and returns to capital, by –0.51 
percent and –1.5 percent have a negative impact on the household’s nominal income. The 
production workers households suffer the least decline in income in the urban as well as 
in the rural area, 0.85 percent and 0.81 percent respectively (Table 11). These are the 
poorest group of households in their respective regions. This implies that trade 
liberalisation is relatively less harmful for the poor. However, variation in change in 
income across the income groups is not very significant.  
The change in consumer prices affects the household specific consumer price 
index (CPI). Table 11 shows that a decline in the CPI is larger than the decline in income 
for  each  household  group, that result in higher real income of households. This exercise   
24Textile is a major exportable sector, i.e., textile sector exports are 67.7 percent of total exports and 44 
percent of total output. 
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Table 11 
Variation in Income and Consumer Price Index of Households (Percentages) 
Trade Liberalisation (55 Percent 
Reduction in Tariff on all 
Imports) 
Trade Liberalisation in Presence of  
Decline in Remittances (Tariff Rate by 
55 Percent and Remittances  
by 44 Percent) 
 
Nominal 
Income 
Household 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Nominal 
Income 
Household Consumer 
Price Index 
Urban Households  
  Professional –0.88 –3.45 –4.97 –7.29 
  Clerks –1.00 –3.44 –10.70 –7.66 
  Agriculture Worker –1.21 –3.46 –9.85 –7.86 
  Production Worker –0.85 –3.43 –8.12 –7.78 
  Miscellaneous –1.10 –3.44 –9.09 –7.35 
  Urban Total –1.00 –3.44 –9.03 –7.58 
Rural Households     
  Professional –1.31 –3.42 –5.87 –7.92 
  Clerks –1.04 –3.40 –6.25 –7.94 
  Agriculture Worker –1.30 –3.25 –6.50 –7.95 
  Production Worker –0.81 –3.36 –7.35 –7.97 
  Miscellaneous –1.19 –3.47 –7.37 –8.06 
  Rural Total –1.16 –3.34 –6.70 –7.97 
Pakistan Total –1.07 –3.39 –7.95 –7.77 
 
shows, that with a given level of government expenditure and investment demand, 
trade liberalisation generates a welfare (equivalent variation) gain to every household 
group in the urban and rural areas. In urban areas, the welfare gain to the poorest 
household group (production worker) is not very different from the welfare gain to 
the relatively rich households (professionals), 2.69 percent and 2.68 percent, 
respectively. While in the rural areas, the welfare gains to the poorest (production 
worker) is the highest, 2.6 percent. The aggregate welfare gain is larger for urban 
households compared to rural households, at 2.6 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively 
(Table 12).  
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Table 12 
Decomposition of Welfare Impact (Percentage Change) 
Households by Socio 
Economic Groups 
Trade Liberalisation 
(55 Percent Reduction 
in Tariff on all 
Imports) 
Total Effect of Trade 
Liberalisation in Presence of 
Decline in Remittances 
(Reduction in Tariff Rate  
by 55 Percent and 
Remittances by 44 Percent) 
Reduction in 
Remittance 
Urban Households    
Professional 2.69 2.50 –0.19 
Clerks 2.60 –3.22 –5.82 
Agriculture Worker 2.53 –2.05 –4.58 
Production Worker 2.68 –0.38 –3.06 
Miscellaneous 2.48 –1.85 –4.33 
Urban Total 2.58 –1.56 –4.14 
Rural Households    
Professional 2.49 2.56 0.07 
Clerks 2.39 1.77 –0.62 
Agriculture Worker 2.00 1.56 –0.44 
Production Worker 2.61 0.64 –1.97 
Miscellaneous 2.39 0.77 –1.62 
Rural Total 2.30 1.41 –0.89 
Pakistan Total 2.45 –0.19 –2.64 
 
The central issue in this study is to find the links between trade liberalisation and 
poverty in Pakistan. The results show that the income of all households declines after the 
shock of a tariff cut (Table 11). The density function (percentage of individuals with 
given income) shifts to the left (Figures 3 to 12). This shift in the density function 
increases the population below the poverty line (old) as more households move towards 
the lower income bracket if the poverty line does not change. However the results show 
that the value of the poverty line declines by 3.4 percent for urban households and by 3.3 
percent for rural households due to change in consumer prices (Table 11). As a result, the 
poverty line shifts to the left. The poverty line shift more than compensates for the fall in 
income, which results in a reduction of the population below the poverty line in each 
household group (Figures 3 to 12).  
Table 13 presents quantitative estimates of FGT indicators (P -measures) for 
absolute poverty; head count (Po), poverty gap (P1) and severity (P2). In the urban and 
the rural areas, the head count ratio declines between 2.4 to 14.4 percent and 3.4 to 
9.6 percent, respectively. The poverty gap and the severity indices have both 
declined in all households in the urban as well as in the rural areas. From the table 
we may note that trade liberalisation is more beneficial for urban households as all 
poverty indicators (P -measures) decline more for households in the urban areas 
(who were relatively poor before simulation) compared to the households in the rural 
area. We can conclude that the policy shock benefits the poor.  
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Table 13   
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Density Functions and Shift in the Density Functions after the Shock 
(Urban Households)  
Figure 3: Density Function
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Figure 4: Density Function 
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Figure 6: Density Function
 (Production worker) 
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Figure 5: Density Function 
(Agriculture)
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Figure 7: Density Function
(Miscellaneous)
0
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.001
0.0012
0.0014
0.0016
-500 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Income
D
e
n
si
ty
 
Base Sim1 Sim2 
Fig. 3. Density Function (Professional) Fig. 4. Density F nction (Clerks) 
Fig. 5. Density Function (Agriculture) Fig. 6. Density Function (Production Worker)
Fig. 7. Density Func io  (Miscellaneous) 
Siddiqui and Kemal  406
Density Functions and Shift in the Density Functions after the Shock  
(Rural Households)                
Figure 8: Density Function
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Graph9: Density Function 
(Clerks)
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Figure 10: Density Function 
(Agriculture ) 
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Figure 11: Density Function 
(Production Worker)
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Figure 12: Density Function 
(Miscellaneous)
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For the analysis of distributive effects of liberalisation, we draw graphs for 
variation in the density function for the urban and rural areas before and after a 
change in government policy; tariff reduction. In Figures 13 and 14 Variation-1 
shows that majority of households in the lower income group change their income 
brackets i.e., households move from the middle-income bracket (500-1000) towards 
the lower income bracket (250-500). There is a very little variation in the higher 
income brackets. This suggests that the income disparity has increased after trade 
liberalisation in the urban as well as in the rural areas of Pakistan. The overall results 
show that absolute poverty has declined by all measures in Pakistan in the presence 
of trade liberalisation. The empirical results on poverty contradict these findings as 
poverty increases by all measures during the period of trade liberalisation (Table 6 
and Table 7). In the next section we explore the other channels which may be the 
cause of the rise in poverty in Pakistan during the 1990s.     
Figure 14: Variation in Density Function
(Rural Households)
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Figure 13: Variation in Density Function
(Urban Househodls)
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Fig. 13. Variation in Density Function (Urban Households) 
Fig. 14. Variation in Density Function (Rural Households) 
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Simulation 2.  Trade Liberalisation in the Presence of Decline in Remittances 
In this section, the results of the combined shock to the economy of a reduction in tariffs 
and a reduction in remittances are discussed. The tariffs and remittances are reduced 
simultaneously by 55 percent and 44 percent, respectively, (the actual decline over the 1990-
2000). The cut in tariff reduces the domestic prices of all imports, which reduce competitiveness 
of the sectors protected in the base period, 1990. The sectors where the tariff was high in the base 
period i.e., non-crop, food, textiles, chemicals, machinery and other miscellaneous manufactured 
imports show an increase in imports. However, the total increase in imports is less than one 
percent compared to 4.5 percent in the first simulation. The decline in remittances restricts the 
inflow of imports because imports are financed by foreign remittances. With the Current 
Account Balance (CAB) constant, decline in remittances is partially compensated by a decline in 
imports and partially by a larger increase in exports from each sector as the real exchange rate 
depreciate. The exports from Pakistan increase by 17.1 percent compared to the increase in 
exports of 6.8 percent in the previous exercise (Table 10).  
Aggregate domestic demand for domestic goods decline by 0.9 percent compared 
to decline in total demand for domestic goods, 0.46 percent in the previous exercise. The 
larger decline can be attributed to decline in the remittance income of households. The 
producer of exportable goods diverts a portion of his sales from the domestic to the 
export market. The largest increase in exports is from textiles, which leads to an increase 
in output from this sector.  However, increase in the exports in all other sectors is not 
equal to the decline in domestic demand in their respective sectors. Therefore, output fell 
in those sectors. This leads to a reallocation of resources including factors of production.   
The results show that demand for labour increases only in ‘textiles’ where 
domestic production increases. All other sectors show a decline in labour demand. The 
wage rate falls by 3.4 percent. Similarly, returns to capital increase only in the textile 
sectors. The overall results show that returns to capital decline by 6.3 percent (Table 10). 
If we compare the effects on macro variables in this and the previous exercise, it becomes 
clear that a decline in remittances has reduced the gains of trade liberalisation.  
The adverse impact of decline in remittances on households depends on the 
households’ share in total remittances. In addition to the decline in remittances, the fall in 
factor prices also has a negative impact on the households’ nominal income (Table 11). 
Households’ income decline by 5 to 10 times higher than in the previous exercise due to 
decline in remittances. In urban areas, the income of clerks declined by 10.7 percent, who 
receive 35.8 percent of remittances. In rural areas, the decline in income is between (–5.9 
percent) to (–7.4 percent). The least decline is in the income of rich households 
(professionals) who receive only 0.2 percent of remittances (Table 9 and Table 11).   
In this simulation, import prices fell by the same amount as in the first simulation 
but PD declined by a higher percentage due to reduction in household demand for goods 
and services. Resultantly, consumer prices fell for all commodities by a larger amount in 
this exercise (Table 11). The results show that rich households in urban and rural areas, 
(professionals) still gain in terms of equivalent variation at 2.5 percent and 2.6 percent 
respectively because, they are least affected through decline in remittance income. All 
other households lose in the urban areas. In rural areas all other households groups also 
gain but less than the rich households. However, the gain of trade liberalisation reduces 
with a decline in remittances.  
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Figures 3 to 12 reveal that a reduction in remittances in the presence of trade 
liberalisation shifts the density curves to the left more than in the previous exercise. These 
figures show that more households shift towards the lower income bracket in this exercise. 
The area specific consumer prices index decline by 7.6 percent and 8.0 percent for the 
urban and rural areas, respectively (Table 11). Resultantly, the poverty lines on the curves 
also shift to the left. The shifts in the poverty lines are more than compensated for some 
households, while for others the opposite is true. Households’ specific poverty effects (P -
measures) of trade liberalisation in presence of the decline in remittances are presented in 
Table 13. In urban areas, households below the poverty line increase in all household 
groups except for those, in the agricultural group of households. In rural areas, the head 
count ratio declines for each group of households. This suggests that trade liberalisation still 
benefits rural households in spite of the decline in remittances. An examination of the 
poverty gap and poverty severity indicators, P1 and P2, gives the same message (Table 13). 
Variation-2 in Figures 13 and 14 reveals distributive effects of liberalisation in the presence 
of a decline in remittances. The figures show a movement of households from the middle-
income bracket (500-1000) towards lower income brackets is very large in this simulation. 
This suggests that a decline in remittances enhanced the adverse distributive impact of trade 
liberalisation. Income disparity increased due to the remittance decline.   
Decomposition Analysis 
A comparison of the results from the two exercises of the tariff cut and decline in 
remittance on welfare and poverty in Pakistan shows that trade liberalisation through tariff 
cuts increases the welfare of urban and rural households compared with the base year. But 
trade liberalisation in the presence of a reduced inflow of remittances reduces the welfare of 
urban households by 1.6 percent. However, rural households still gain in terms of welfare 
by 1.4 percent (Table 12). The third column in the Table 12 shows that the decline in 
remittances reduces welfare of each household in urban and rural households (except 
professional households in rural areas who receive only 1 percent of remittances), this is 
contrary to trade liberalisation effect where every household gains. The negative impact of 
remittance decline on urban households (–4.14 percent) is larger than the negative impact 
on rural households (–0.89 percent). In terms of total effects, the negative impact of 
remittance dominates the positive impact of trade liberalisation for urban households. The 
reverse is true for rural households as they still show a welfare gain. 
Percentage changes in FGT-indicators for three effects: (1) tariff cut, (2) tariff cut and 
decline in remittances, and (3) decline in remittances only are presented in Table 13. The table 
shows that absolute poverty has declined in urban as well as in rural households because of trade 
liberalisation. However, with the decline in remittances poverty rises according to all P -
measures in the both areas, urban and rural. The results of trade liberalisation in the presence of a 
decline in remittances shows that remittance impact dominates for urban households, but trade 
liberalisation impact dominates for rural households in terms of the total effect.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The paper explores the contribution of trade liberalisation policies and decline in 
remittance income of households to welfare and poverty in Pakistan. It analyses the impact of 
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trade liberalisation through tariff cut in the absence and the presence of decline in remittances 
on welfare and poverty in a CGE framework. Trade liberalisation boosts exports and benefits 
most the export-oriented labour-intensive sector, textiles. It is relatively more harmful to the 
sector specific factor of production, capital. The gains are larger for urban households than for 
rural households in terms of both welfare enhancement and poverty reduction. The study 
comes out with the conclusion that a tariff cut is welfare inducing and poverty reducing and 
trade liberalisation is not the cause of the rise in poverty in Pakistan during the 1990s.  
In the second set of experiments, trade liberalisation in the presence of a decline in 
remittances reduces the gains of trade liberalisation. It reduces the welfare of urban 
households over the base year. Although rural households still show an increase in welfare 
over the base year, but less than the welfare gain with trade liberalisation only. According 
to all FGT indicators, poverty increases in urban households but not in rural households. 
This shock hurts more the relatively poorer group of households, clerks and production 
workers, who receive the major share of remittances.   
Decomposition of impact of trade liberalisation and decline in remittances show 
explicitly that poverty increases according to all poverty measures in rural and urban areas 
of all households from a decline in remittances. However, the negative impact of remittance 
decline dominates the positive impact of trade liberalisation in urban areas and the positive 
impact of trade liberalisation dominates the negative impact of a decline in remittances in 
the rural area. We conclude from this that the decline in remittance inflows is a major 
contributory factor in explaining the rise in poverty in Pakistan. Trade liberalisation 
increases income inequality. Decline in remittances reinforces this impact.   
APPENDIX A 
COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOR PAKISTAN 
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1. Ci Total Consumption of ith Good 42. YFK Firms Capital Income 
2. CGi Government final Consumption of Good i Exogenous Variables 
3. CTG Total Government Consumption 1. CAB Current Account Balance 
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17. PI Price Deflator for Investment 2. aij Input Output Coefficients 
18. Pi Producer Price 3. Bi CES scale parameter of value added 
19. Pti Domestic price without taxes 4. BeT CET scale parameter of Import aggregation 
function 
20. PiC Price of Composite good 5. Bcs CES scale parameter of export 
transformation function 
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Endogenous Variables   Symbols 
26.
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27. Ri Rate of Return on capital in branch n 12. kH Household Share of Capital Income 
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